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DESCARTES'S SELF-DOUBT 
I SHALL contend that even though Descartes is sometimes 
certain that he exists, he sometimes doubts that he exists. He 
believes that two kinds of things exist when he knows that he 
exists. On the one hand, what exist are occurrent acts of thinking. 
He knows that they exist because he "observes" them. On the 
other hand, he believes that what exists is a thinking substance. 
Such substances are not "observed." They may be known to 
exist only by establishing that God does not deceive him about 
the belief that an act of thinking must be in a thinking substance. 
Thus Descartes's claim to know that he, qua particular thinking 
substance, exists can be doubted prior to the proofs for the 
existence and goodness of God. Descartes does exhibit self-doubt 
in the third Meditation. 
My strategy will be to provide an exposition of the view of the 
self' found in the "Synopsis" and again near the end of the 
Meditations. Following this, I shall discuss the doubt of the third 
Meditation. Initially I establish that in a specified sense Descartes 
can doubt that he exists. Then I show that he does doubt that he 
exists. Because my aim is primarily to highlight a particular 
reading of the text, I shall restrict most comments about several 
current and different interpretations to footnotes.2 
1 My use of "self" needs qualification. I use it in connection with the dis- 
cussions about Descartes's nature which are independent of his discussions 
about having a body. Descartes sometimes views himself as a union of mind 
and body, as he emphasizes in the sixth Meditation. That he can doubt that 
the union of mind and body exists prior to the proofs about God (because prior 
to them he does not know that bodies exist) is a different and uncontroversial 
feature of the Meditations. I am concerned with the view of himself as one who 
thinks. 
2 There are numerous important articles offering interpretations which leave 
little room for Descartes's uneasiness and eventual self-doubt. See, e.g., James 
D. Carney, "Cogito, Ergo Sum and Sum Res Cogitans," Philosophical Review, 
LXXI (i962), 494-496; Harry G. Frankfurt, "Descartes's Discussion of His 
Existence in the Second Meditation," Philosophical Review, LXXV (I966), 
329-356; Robert Grimm, "Cogito, ergo sum.," Theoria, XXXI (i965), 
159-I73; Jaakko Hintikka, "Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?," 
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In the "Synopsis" of the Meditations, Descartes explains why 
his discussion of self-knowledge is not complete until the sixth 
Meditation. He says that in the second Meditation he indicates a 
conception of the mind (or soul) but that it is not until the last 
Meditation that he shows that our conceptions of the mind and 
body "are true in the very way in which we think them" (HR, 
p. 140; all references are to the Haldane-Ross version of Des- 
cartes's texts and to the first volume unless otherwise indicated). 
The conception is that "the human mind is not... composed of any 
accidents, but is a pure substance. For although all the accidents 
of mind be changed, although, for instance, it think certain things, 
will others, perceive others, etc., despite all this it does not 
emerge from these changes another mind" (HR, p. 141). What 
Descartes attempts to show after the second Meditation is that 
our conception of the mind accords with what actually exists. 
Because Descartes himself says that his discussion of the self is not 
complete until the last Meditation, to emphasize the sixth Medi- 
tation discussion of the self is to be faithful to Descartes's own 
emphasis. 
The main features of Descartes's view of the self are: (i) the 
self includes, and sometimes is identified with, an enduring 
substance, and a substance of a certain kind namely, a thinking 
substance; (2) occurrent acts of thinking (for example, sudden 
rememberings, doubtings, believings, and so forth) are viewed 
as properties ("modes") of substance; (3) the acts of thinking 
are "found" or "observed"; and (4) Descartes "rightly concludes" 
that he knows that he is a thinking thing or substance provided 
he knows that God exists and is good. 
Philosophical Review, LXXI (i962), 3-32 (hereafter referred to as H-I) and 
"Cogito, Ergo Sum as an Inference and a Performance," Philosophical Review, 
LXXII (i963), 487-496, (hereafter referred to as H-Il). Each of these authors 
focuses on the certainty of Descartes's claims of self-knowledge. Carney and 
Grimm emphasize that Descartes's view of the self appeals to substances and 
properties and that Descartes must somehow justify this view. They do not, it 
seems to me, emphasize sufficiently the possibility and the actuality of doubt 
associated with this justification. E. B. Allaire, in "The Circle of Ideas and the 
Circularity of the Meditations," Dialogue, 2 (i966), I3I-I53, does so. The 
interpretation I advance relies in many ways on his reading. 
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Here is Descartes's briefest characterization of the self: 
The mind is entirely indivisible. For, as a matter of fact, when I con- 
sider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking 
thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself 
to be clearly one and entire. . . . And the faculties of willing, feeling, 
conceiving, etc. cannot be properly speaking said to be its parts, for it 
is one and the same mind which employs itself in willing and in feeling 
and understanding [HR, p. I96]. 
The passage emphasizes the simplicity or unity of the self. The 
self has no parts and hence ought not to be considered a complex 
of elements related in some way(s): it is not, a la Hume, an 
ordered series of states or events. Instead, the self is some kind of 
persisting element involved in all of a person's conscious psycho- 
logical biography: that is, it is a constant in the part of one's 
history which includes one's mental acts.3 The view that these 
acts are part of the self is rejected, at least when "properly 
speaking." Nevertheless, they are connected with a single, 
persisting element (at least in the case of a single person). This 
connection is epistemologically important. It is employed in 
securing knowledge that such a persisting element exists. 
Descartes offers two accounts of how one may know that one's 
substantial self exists. The first makes explicit what is only implicit 
in the second: one needs to know that God exists and is no 
deceiver prior to knowing that the persisting element exists. Both 
accounts make clear that Descartes considers the persisting 
element to be a thinking thing or substance. Here is the first 
account: 
I know that all things which I apprehend clearly and distinctly can be 
created by God as I apprehend them. ... Therefore, just because I 
know certainly that I exist, and that meanwhile I do not remark that 
any other thing necessarily pertains to my nature or essence, excepting 
3I use "mental acts" for what Ryle might be willing to call occurrent states 
of mind-e.g., my now remembering an appointment I have, my now thinking 
I had better call home, his long-awaited assent to a proposal, etc. Descartes 
mentions these, though he employs a different terminology, in HR, p. I59. 
He speaks of activities (of the mind) in Vol. II, p. 64. 
53 
DONALD SIEVERT 
that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists 
solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing (or a substance whose whole 
essence or nature is to think) [HR, p. i90]. 
He reminds us that he is certain that he exists.4 He adds that 
because God can and does create things in such a way that my 
clear and distinct apprehensions (conceptions)5 of them accord 
with the way things are, and because he cannot clearly and 
distinctly conceive himself except as a thinking thing (substance), 
he may legitimately conclude that he is a thinking substance. Less 
technically: he cannot conceive of himself except as a thinking 
substance, and because he has good theological reason to accept 
such a view of the self, he may conclude that he is a thinking 
substance.6 
The discussion continues and a second way of knowing that a 
thinking substance exists is introduced: 
I further find in myself faculties employing modes of thinking peculiar 
to themselves, to wit, the faculties of imagination and feeling ... 
which . . . cannot be .. . conceived apart from me, that is without an 
intelligent substance in which they reside for . . . in their formal con- 
cept, some kind of intellection is comprised from which I infer that they 
are distinct from me as its modes are from a thing. I observe also in me 
some other faculties . .. which cannot be conceived, any more than can 
the preceding, apart from substance to which they are attached, and 
consequently cannot exist without it [HR, p. iso; emphasis mine]. 
Here Descartes notes a distinction between one's mental acts and 
the persisting element-the thinking thing or substance-with 
4 I shall have more to say about the nature and grounds of this certainty 
later. 
5 Descartes often uses this pair of words interchangeably. And, at least 
sometimes, he uses "thinking thing" and "thinking substance" interchangeably 
as well. 
6 There is a complex of issues surrounding Descartes's claims about what 
he is and his claims that he is. Often, he combines the claims by saying that he is 
a thinking thing. To say this is to say that he is a certain kind of thing as well as 
that he-i.e., something of that kind-exists. One of the complexities (which 
I touch on briefly later) of the second Meditation is Descartes's tendency to run 
these claims together. He worries simultaneously about what kind of thing he is 
and (the grounds for) his certainty that he is. 
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which he has identified the self. He also notes a relation between 
two kinds of things: no act can exist apart from a self. More 
accurately: he cannot conceive of acts except as connected with a 
self. He assumes (as the context makes clear) that a good God exists 
and thus concludes that in fact no act can exist apart from a self. 
This conclusion, coupled with the fact that he "observes" mental 
acts, enables him to conclude further that when he "observes" a 
mental act there is a thinking substance "in" which it exists. Thus 
an argument for the existence of a thinking substance is offered. 
The gist of the argument is: 
(i) I "observe" occurrent mental acts. 
(2) I cannot conceive of them existing apart from a thinking 
substance. 
(3) If God is no deceiver, I may conclude that my inability 
to conceive of occurrent acts existing apart from a 
thinking substance accords with the fact that they 
cannot exist apart from such a substance. 
(4) Therefore, providing God is no deceiver, whenever I 
"observe" a mental act I may "rightly conclude" that 
there is a thinking substance "in" which those acts are 
or to which they are "attached"-that is, that I am a 
thinking thing or substance. 
On such a view, Descartes's claim that a thinking substance exists 
is the conclusion of an argument. Furthermore, it is the conclusion 
of an argument whose soundness depends on the soundness of 
earlier arguments for the existence and goodness of God. 
I Spelling out the nature of such "observation" (Descartes's word!) is no 
small matter, as is spelling out what it means to say that Descartes is the one 
who observes his own mental acts. I suppose that Descartes means something 
like what others have meant by "introspection." To say that it is Descartes who 
"observes" himself could mean that a second act, one of direct acquaintance or 
awareness and one which is "in" the same substance as the one which is 
"observed," occurs. (Another possibility will be mentioned in discussing 
Hintikka later.) R. Chisholm, in "On the Observability of the Self," Philo- 
sophy and Phenomenological Research, XXX (i 969), 7-2i, discusses this issue and 
derives an argument for the observability of substances from it. Both his 
essay and replies appear in Paul Kurtz (ed.), Language and Human Nature 
(St. Louis, I97 ). 
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Before commenting on the argument, it is noteworthy that 
Descartes himself provides a formulation quite close to the above: 
Substance cannot be first discovered merely from the fact that it is a 
thing that exists, for that fact alone is not observed by us. We may, however, 
easily discover it by means of any one of its attributes because it is a 
common notion that nothing is possessed of no attributes, properties, 
or qualities. For this reason, when we perceive any attribute, we there- 
fore conclude that some existing thing or substance to which it may be 
attributed, is necessarily present [Principles of Philosophy, HR, p. 240; 
emphasis mine]. 
Here, too, Descartes distinguishes between things or substances 
which have attributes, and attributes, and says that although we 
can not observe substances, we can know that they exist when we 
observe attributes, properties, or qualities. The basis for such 
knowledge is the "common notion" that every attribute is in a 
substance.8 Knowledge that substances exist, he implies, requires 
inference. Prior to this passage, Descartes has argued that God 
exists and that He is not a deceiver and, specifically, that God 
would not deceive us about the relevant clear and distinct con- 
ceptions and, what seems to amount to the same thing, "common 
notions" (HR, pp. 231-232, 238-239). The passage thus supports 
the interpretation advanced here. Others do so as well (see, for 
example, HR, II, 63-64 and 98). 
Some elaboration and explanation will be useful in relating 
this interpretation to others and to other things that Descartes 
says. He is maintaining, I submit, that self-knowledge may be 
viewed as partly a matter of "observation." We do "observe" 
8 Notice that an operative assumption is that qualities are "in" substances. 
My interpretation involves the suggestion that acts (which include ideas) are 
(complexes of) qualities. If one believes that every quality is a quality of some- 
thing, and if one construes the belief in terms of qualities being in substances, 
then one sees how easy it is to insist that if one knows that a quality exists, one 
knows that a substance exists. One has, in effect, built the notion of being in a 
substance into the notion of being a quality. For places in which the tendency 
is manifest in Descartes, see HR, II, 64, 98. Chisholm, in the essay cited in the 
previous footnote, does something very similar. Combining the notions as 
indicated is probably one of the contributing causes to Descartes's "certainty" 
that he qua thinking substance exists prior to knowledge of God. I say more 
about this shortly. 
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(our own) acts. In so far as such acts are instances of thinking, 
we may be sure that thinking exists when we "observe" acts. The 
claim that we "observe" acts may be what leads Descartes to claim 
sometimes that he can know that he exists regardless of whether 
the deceiving genius exists (HR, pp. I50, I53, I58-I59), that 
what assures him of the truth of his assertion that he exists is the 
perception of that which he asserts (HR, p. I58) and that he 
knows that he exists by a kind of mental vision (HR, II, 38). As 
we saw, part of Descartes's argument that he exists is the claim 
that he "observes" (his own) mental acts.9 
Descartes leaves no doubt that he also sometimes explicitly 
views self-knowledge as involving inference. In response to 
Gassendi's suggestion that actions other than thinking may 
suffice for self-knowledge, he says: 
When you say that I could have inferred the same conclusion from any of my 
other actions, you wander far from the truth, because there is none of my 
activities of which I am wholly certain . . . save thinking alone. For 
example you have no right to make the inference: I walk, hence I exist, 
except in so far as our awareness of walking is a thought; it is of this 
alone that the inference holds good. ... Hence from the fact that I 
think that I walk I can very well infer the existence of the mind which 
so thinks, but not of the body which walks. So it is also in all other cases 
[HR, II, 207]. 
I take Descartes to be saying that the only activities of which he 
is certain are those of thinking. The claim that he is walking is 
doubtful (because it is doubtful that bodies exist prior to proofs 
about God). The claim that a thought that he walks occurs is not 
doubtful, however and, Descartes says, it is in so far as there is a 
thought that the inference that he exists "holds good."10 The 
9 In effect, Descartes suggests that there would be an "existential inconsis- 
tency" involved in his correctly reporting that he "observes" an act of thinking 
and denying that what he so "observes" exists. This relates to Hintikka's 
remarks about thinking activities cited later. 
10 Notice that Descartes says that the inference that his mind exists "holds 
good" when he has a thought. This has interesting implications. One is that he 
is saying he may infer that he exists from the occurrence of a thought. Another 
is that the subject matter of the thought-i.e., what the thought is about-is 
irrelevant. The thought that I walk functions as well as any thought as far as the 
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inference-is from the existence of a thought to the existence of a 
mind which has thoughts. Thus I submit that Descartes, at least 
sometimes, views self-knowledge as a matter of inference involving 
moving from claims about the occurrence of thoughts (or ideas) 
to claims about the existence of a thinking substance. Yet infer- 
ence, for Descartes, carries with it the risk of doubt. 
Descartes's general pattern of doubt is the questioning of 
alleged relations between what he observes and what he does 
not observe. He does not doubt, and cannot imagine doubting, 
the existence of what he observes at a given moment. Doubt 
arises when inference is introduced, when he judges or infers that 
what he observes is related to something else. Of central concern 
to Descartes is justifying inferences from the occurrence of 
"observed" ideas to the existence of things "represented by" 
ideas. He says in the third Meditation: 
Now as to what concerns ideas, if we consider them only in themselves 
and do not relate them to anything else beyond themselves, they cannot 
properly speaking be false. .. . Thus there remains no more than the 
judgments which we make, in which I must take the greatest care not 
to deceive myself. But the principal error and the commonest which we 
may meet with in them, consists in judging that the ideas which are in 
me are similar or conformable to the things which are outside me; 
for without doubt if I considered the ideas only as certain modes of 
my thoughts, without trying to relate them to anything beyond, they 
could scarely give me material for error [HR, pp. I59-I 6o]. 
In this passage, Descartes initially mentions possible error invol- 
ving judging that ideas conform to things outside himself. He 
goes on to show, however that error, and therefore doubt, is 
possible when we try to relate ideas to anything beyond certain 
modes of his thoughts. Interestingly enough, in the third Medi- 
tation Descartes also mentions the idea of himself "which repre- 
inference that a mind exists goes. Hence Descartes's argument for the existence 
of his mind is not so closely tied to thoughts about his own existence as Hintikka 
suggests. In fact, most of the examples of the kinds of thoughts which provide 
Descartes with the certainty that he exists are about things other than his own 
existence. The mere fact that he was persuaded of something, or that he was 
deceived about something-anything whatsoever-assures his existence 
(HR, pp- I50, I57). 
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sents me to myself" (HR, p. i64) and the idea of himself as the 
idea of substance (HR, p. i66). Doubt about the conformity of 
his idea of himself to something else, such as a thinking substance, 
is presumably an instance of the kind of possible error or doubt 
in question. Doubt about the existence of a thinking substance, 
if one "observes" not it but only an idea or property of it, is 
therefore possible in principle. 
Descartes believes that he cannot be mistaken about what he 
"observes." Hence not even the demon can deceive him about 
knowing that an act he is "observing" exists. He' can be certain 
that (his) mental acts exist when and because he "observes" 
them. Such perceptual metaphors and the knowledge they involve 
do not suffice for knowledge of the self qua thinking substance, 
however. Knowing that an act (or idea of a thinking substance) 
exists because one "observes" it is one thing; knowing that an 
act belongs to some thinking substance or other (or that the idea of 
a thinking substance actually represents such a substance) is 
another, though related, thing. (It is tantamount to knowing 
that every act is in a substance.) Knowing that a particular act 
belongs to a particular substance (or that the idea of a thinking 
substance represents a particular thinking substance) is yet a 
third thing." Each involves a kind of self-knowledge. Yet only 
the last involves the kind of knowledge he ultimately seeks in the 
sixth Meditation-namely, knowledge that a particular thinking 
substance exists. Descartes seems not to have distinguished these 
three pieces of knowledge sharply enough.12 For what is of concern 
Descartes must show not only that all of "his" acts are in some substance 
but that they are all in a single substance. 
12 Lichtenberg apparently urged that instead of saying "I think" we ought 
to say "it thinks." One way to construe his dictum is to say that someone like 
Descartes can establish, at most, that where there is an act there is a thinking 
substance. That is, one can know only that an act is in some substance or other 
and not in a particular substance. Schlick and Strawson mention linguistic 
variants of this thesis: one ought not (and perhaps cannot) assert that I think 
unless one is prepared to assert also that she thinks, he thinks, etc. If one is not 
so prepared, then one ought to say, at most, that it thinks in "one's own case." 
Wittgenstein took the dictum to express that "no Ego is involved in. thinking." 
He thereby suggests another interpretation-viz., that instead of saying 
"I think" one ought to say "there is a thought." (Strawson and Schlick, though 
in different ways, accept this version.) This second interpretation involves a 
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here, it is worth noting the distinctions and some of their impli- 
cations. 
One implication, one's ability to be certain that a mental act 
exists regardless of whether the demon exists, was mentioned 
above. Another is that, even if Descartes cannot help believing 
that acts are in thinking substances, he does not claim to know 
that this belief is true until after he has established God's existence 
and goodness.13 As we saw, God's goodness is what assures that 
some such clear and distinct conception is true. Therefore, prior 
to knowing that God exists and is no deceiver, Descartes cannot 
know that acts are in substances (much less that a particular act 
is in a particular substance). He can know that acts exist inde- 
pendently of knowledge of God; he cannot know that he, a think- 
ing substance, exists independently of that knowledge. Thus, to 
rejection not only of the claim that where there is an act there is some particular 
thinking substance, but of the claim that where there is an act there is any 
substance at all. Descartes, I am suggesting, is sure only that there is a thought 
-i.e., an act of thinking-at one stage of his argument. In effect, he allows that 
prior to knowledge of God he can know, when he thinks, that "there is a 
thought" is true and not that "I, a thinking substance (an Ego) exists" is true. 
Wittgenstein reports and endorses Lichtenberg's dictum according to 
Moore's "Wittgenstein's Lectures in I930-33" in G. E. Moore, Philosophical 
Papers (New York, I959), p. 309. Schlick's discussion is in "Meaning and Veri- 
fication" in Readings in Philosophical Analysis (New York, I949), pp. I46-I70. 
Strawson's views are in his "Persons" chapter in Individuals (London, I959). 
He comments directly on the Lichtenberg dictum in a footnote on p. 95. For a 
discussion of Strawson's position, see my "Strawson on Persons," The Modern 
Schoolman, XLVIII (I97I), 237-262, and "How Well Can One Get to Know 
a Strawsonian Person?", in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXXIV. 
(I974), 5I5-527. 
13 There is even a sense in which Descartes can be said to profess, con- 
tinually, certainty about his substantial self. He sometimes assumes certain 
beliefs are true at one time and then calls them into question at a later stage of 
his argument. E.g., he questions the claims of physics while assuming the truth 
of those of arithmetic and geometry. Subsequently he doubts arithmetical and 
geometrical claims. Even after raising the doubt about those claims, he tells us 
at the end of the first and early in the third Meditation how difficult it is to 
sustain the doubt. I construe such comments psychologically, as Descartes 
urges us to do at the end of the first Meditation: as a matter of psychological 
fact, it is difficult to doubt arithmetic and geometry continually, even after 
legitimate grounds for doubt have been raised. I suggest that the belief that 
("observed") acts are in substances is one which may be doubted but which is 
difficult to doubt, again as a matter of psychological fact. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, Descartes does not find it easy to doubt his own existence. 
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put it differently, prior to knowledge of God's existence and 
goodness there is a possibility for doubt about his own existence: 
he may doubt that his acts reside in a thinking substance. (That 
Descartes does raise this doubt is established below.) 
Needless to say, I do not want to deny or fail to acknowledge 
that Descartes does claim (rightly, I think, within his system) to 
have some certainty regarding himself prior to the proofs about 
God. On the contrary, the "observation" of mental acts provides 
justification of some of Descartes's expressions of certainty about 
himself. Doubts about a thinking substance are, however, com- 
patible with the "observation" and the attendant knowledge of 
acts. The reason is that knowledge that acts exist is only part of 
what is involved in knowing that the substantial self exists. 
Because the doubt about thinking substance and the knowledge 
about acts are about different matters, both can be present 
without contradiction. 
The interpretation advanced here explains Descartes's seem- 
ingly contradictory characterizations of his knowledge that he 
is a thinking thing. Sometimes, as we have seen, he implies that 
inference is involved. At other times, he appears to reject infer- 
ence14 and uses perceptual metaphors in describing such knowl- 
edge. Both sorts of characterizations have a place if my reading 
is correct. On the one hand, Descartes can know that thinking 
occurs because he "observes" acts of thinking; such knowledge is 
14 Descartes, in HR, II, 38, denies that one "deduces existence from thought 
by a syllogism" and thus seems to reject the view that self-knowledge involves 
inference. I find the passage very difficult. Hintikka in H-II and Weinberg in 
his "Cogito, Ergo Sum: Some Reflections on Mr. Hintikka's Article," Philo- 
sophical Review, LXXI (i962), 483-49I, even disagree about the referent of "it" 
in crucial sentences. I think one thing is clear in the passage: a specific inference 
pattern, one involving Everything that thinks is, or exists as a major premise, 
is rejected. Whether Descartes employs "I think, hence I am, or exist" as part 
of an inference remains unclear. He seems to want to say of it that its truth is 
known by "a simple act of mental vision." This could mean either that he 
"observes" an act of thinking and thereby knows it exists or that he clearly and 
distinctly conceives that an act of thinking must be in a thinking substance. 
I see no way of deciding between the two. It is unfortunate that Descartes does 
not introduce in this context his categories of property and substance. Were 
he to do so, and thereby make clear precisely what it is he is claiming exists, 
one could decide between the alternatives. 
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not inferential. On the other hand, because he denies that we 
"observe" the substance to which such acts are believed to 
"belong," inference of the sort sketched earlier is needed. 
Descartes sometimes directs us away from the inferential pattern 
toward the "observation" pattern; at other times, he relies on 
the inferential pattern. 
Finally, I want to deal with what appears to be a serious 
difficulty with the interpretation being advanced here. Descartes 
tends to employ "I think, therefore I exist" rather than "A thought 
exists, therefore I exist." One might argue that because he 
asserts "I think, therefore I exist" he is presupposing that the 
referent of "I" exists when he asserts "I think." One might also 
claim that this preference for "I think, therefore I exist" shows 
that he is not appealing to "A thought exists, therefore I exist" 
and, in turn, that he is not appealing to the inference-pattern I 
have indicated. I maintain that he does make such appeals and 
that the significance of Descartes's employing "I think" rather 
than "A thought exists" is, in this context, minor. Combining 
these points enables one to maintain, in addition and against one 
line of criticism, that Descartes's appeal to inference for self- 
knowledge is non-trivial. 
In the reply to Gassendi cited earlier, Descartes distinguishes 
between the activity of walking and the thought that he walks. 
In connection with inferring the existence of a mind, he says that 
"it is of this [thought that I walk] alone that the inference holds 
good." Thus he comes close, quite close, to saying that because a 
thought exists, he exists. I suspect that the reason this sort of 
formulation does not occur more often is that Descartes mixes 
our ordinary manner of expressing the occurrence of a thought 
("I think") with the manner appropriate when one uses language 
to highlight his ontological and epistemological commitments 
("A thought exists"). (These commitments are his substance- 
property ontology and his denial that we "observe" substances.) 
Ordinary discourse encourages the use of "I think"; but his use 
of "I" is misleading because he does not "observe" the substance 
to which the word may be believed to refer. Briefly: for Descartes 
the ordinary syntax by which we express the occurrence of 
thinking is not a good guide to what is known by "observation" to 
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exist when one is thinking. Russell puts the point nicely when he 
says: "The word 'I' is really illegitimate [for] he ought to state 
his ultimate premise in the form 'there are thoughts.' The word 
'I' is grammatically convenient, but does not describe a datum."'15 
If one accepts the preceding suggestion, another advantage of 
my reading results. It will no longer be correct to assert, as 
Hintikka does for example, that if one construes cogito, ergo sum as 
an inference it is trivial. In dealing with those passages having to 
do with knowledge of the mind in which Descartes appeals to 
inference, Hintikka transcribes "I think" as "B(a)." The latter 
represents that an existent individual, a, has the property or 
activity represented by "B." He claims that the transition from 
"B(a)" to the claim that a exists-namely, (Ex)(x= a)-is 
trivial because a is assumed to exist in the assertion of "B(a)." I 
question his transcription; interestingly enough, he does so as 
well. (Incidentally, to question his transcription is to question 
his treatment of cogito, ergo sum as an inference.) 
Hintikka's transcription represents a particular account of 
what is known to exist in cases of thinking according to Descartes. 
Hintikka presupposes that the syntax of ordinary language is a 
good guide to the syntax of transcriptions into notations which 
perspicuously reflect such an account. But once one introduces 
the distinction between our ordinary mode of discourse and one 
which more accurately reflects Descartes's ontology and epistemo- 
logy, Hintikka's transcription is suspect because what is known to 
exist by "observation" is an act of thinking. It becomes more 
plausible to transcribe "I think" as an explicit existential claim 
that there is an act of thinking. The result is that the inference to 
which Descartes appeals is non-trivial. The claim that there is an 
act of thinking, when coupled with the claim that every act of 
thinking must be in a thinking substance, entitles one to conclude 
soundly and yet non-trivially (that is, without the "existential 
presupposition" that a substance exists) that there is a thinking 
substance. (This, I think, is the gist of what Descartes tells 
Gassendi.) 
15 Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (London, i96i), p. 550. 
See also n. I2. 
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In his own way, Hintikka sometimes allows that using "I 
think" need only commit one to the occurrence of an act of 
thinking and not to a (thinking) substance. (This is tantamount 
to questioning the occurrence of "a" in his transcription.) He 
says: "The function of the word cogito in Descartes's dictum is to 
refer to the thought-act through which the existential self-verifia- 
bility of 'I exist' manifests itself" (H-I, p. i6) and "The word 
cogito. . . refers to the 'performance' (to the act of thinking) 
through which the sentence 'I exist' may be said to verify itself" 
(H-I, p. I7). He emphasizes this gambit when he confronts the 
distinction between substances and properties and the issue of 
knowledge of substances in his second paper. He cites a passage 
in which Descartes says we do not directly apprehend substances; 
rather, we apprehend them in virtue of their being the subject of 
activities. Hintikka then says: 
For even if our awareness of our mental activities is immediate, there 
must first be an activity of which one can be aware. I do not think it is 
therefore at all implausible to suggest that the activity by means of which 
we are aware of our own thinking is in the special case of the cogito 
insight the very same activity of which we are aware and which is the 
only way in which the essence of our mind manifests its existence 
[H-Il, pp. 495-496]. 
In a footnote to the above he says: "In the case of a direct primary 
insight like the Cogito the object of thinking cannot be the thinking 
being or the mind as a substance, however, for this we cannot 
apprehend directly. Hence it can only be an activity of the mind." 
I find several things noteworthy in Hintikka's statements. 
He suggests that "observation" (his word is "awareness") of 
acts of thinking occurs in the case of the "cogito insight." Hintikka 
explicitly asserts that "cogito," and therefore "I think," can be 
viewed as referring solely to the activity of thinking. Hence for 
him the use of "I" in "I think" does not presuppose the existence 
of a substance. Therefore his transcription of "I think" as "B(a)" 
is called into question. He allows for his "performance" inter- 
pretation what he does not allow for his inference interpretation, 
namely, that "I" need not be interpreted as referring to an indi- 
vidual substance. What he says about "I exist" is less clear. 
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Either it, too, refers solely to the activity of thinking, in which 
case it is verified by the awareness of such activities as his state- 
ments suggest, or else it refers to a substance. In the latter case he, 
like Descartes, simply assumes at certain points that an act of 
thinking cannot occur apart from a thinking substance. In either 
case, Hintikka concedes in effect that he has not adequately 
treated the issue of knowledge of substance. He says that the view 
that Descartes believes that "what we know directly is not the 
mind itself (the substance) but rather its activities" is one which 
is too complicated for him to take up in his article and which he 
hopes to return to on another occasion (H-II, p. 495). By implica- 
tion, he thereby raises question once more about his tran- 
scription and, in turn, his treatment of cogito, ergo sum as an 
inference. 
II 
In the previous section, I tried to show that Descartes takes the 
claim that a thinking substance exists to be a conclusion to an 
argument. A premise of that argument involves an existential 
assertion-namely, the claim that acts of thinking exist. I want 
to employ this reading in explicating an important and puzzling 
passage from the third Meditation. The passage is important 
because it indicates that some knowledge is dependent on know- 
ledge that a good God exists; it is puzzling because it suggests 
that self-knowledge is also dependent upon such theological 
knowledge. 
Here is the passage: 
When I direct my attention to things which I believe myself to perceive 
very clearly, I am so persuaded of their truth that I let myself break 
out into words such as these: Let who will deceive me, He can never 
cause me to be nothing while I think that I am, or some day cause it to 
be true that I have never been, it being true now to say that I am, or 
that two and three make more or less than five, or any such thing in 
which I see a manifest contradiction. And, certainly, since I have no 
reason to believe that there is a God who is a deceiver, and as I have 
not yet satisfied myself that there is a God at all, the reason for doubt 
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which depends on this opinion alone is very slight, and so to speak 
metaphysical. But in order to be able to altogether remove it, I must 
inquire whether there is a God . . . and if I find that there is a God, I 
must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for without a knowl- 
edge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be certain of any- 
thing [HR, pp. I 58- I 59] . 
Descartes begins by recapitulating part of what he has indicated 
earlier in the Meditations. His conviction of the truth of some 
claims is such that, even granting the existence of a deceiving 
demon for the sake of argument, he is "persuaded" of those 
claims. He then implies that the possible existence of a demon does 
raise doubt about the truth of those claims, though. Such doubt, 
unless backed up by positive evidence for the demon's existence, 
is "very slight." It must nevertheless be removed by excluding 
the possibility that the demon exists. A way to do this is to prove 
that there is a God who is not a deceiver. Thus there is a set of 
claims which Descartes is inclined to accept but which may be 
doubted if even the possibility of the demon remains. Proving 
that a good, nondeceiving God exists will effectively eliminate 
the doubt. 
What are the claims about which Descartes is "persuaded" 
but which nonetheless may be doubted prior to the proofs about 
God? The two he unmistakably and explicitly mentions are that 
he exists while he thinks that he is and that two and three make 
(exactly) five ! (Clearly, the latter is merely illustrative of a 
group of claims. My concern is just with the former.) Thus 
Descartes is saying that he is inclined to assert or believe that he 
exists while he thinks that he is, regardless of whether or not there 
is a demon. He claims, however, that such an assertion is justified, 
strictly speaking, only after he has eliminated the demon possi- 
bility.16 
16 Note that Descartes is in effect questioning the cr iterion of clarity and 
distinctness which he would like to employ: he says the claims in question have 
to do with things he believes he perceives clearly and distinctly. Thus here he 
has a concern mentioned in part I: showing that God creates things in accord 
with the way we clearly and distinctly perceive them. Note also that insofar as 
Descartes views some self-knowledge as inferential, the doubt may be construed 
as being about particular inferences. 
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My point about the above passage can be put differently. At 
the end of the passage, Descartes says that without knowledge 
that God exists and is not a deceiver, he can never be certain of 
"anything." The extension of "anything" presumably includes 
the two claims mentioned earlier in the paragraph. (I do not 
think, however, the extension can be so broad as to include, 
literally, everything.) The extension of "anything" includes, then, 
the claim that Descartes exists while he thinks that he is. Descartes 
is thus claiming that he cannot be certain that he exists prior to 
proving his claims about God. Startling though this move may 
be in light of Descartes's various professions of certainty about his 
existence, the move's presence is unmistakable. 
Descartes is saying that, although he is psychologically persua- 
ded that he exists, there is doubt about such a claim. In short, he 
exhibits self-doubt.17 Yet how can he both affirm and doubt that 
he exists? I suggest that he thinks in terms of the argument 
sketched in the previous section. So doing, he can on the one 
hand insist throughout the second Meditation (and elsewhere) 
that there is a sense in which, regardless of the demon possibility, 
he can be certain that he exists: insofar as he considers himself in 
terms of the acts which he "observes," he can be certain that 
they exist whether or not there is a demon or a good God because 
17 Frankfurt, op. cit., pp. 35 I-353, takes the third Meditation passage serious- 
ly. But he directs one away from it by citing a passage from the Replies in which 
Descartes claims that 
When I said that we could know nothing with certainty unless we were first aware 
that God existed, I announced in express terms that I referred only to the science 
apprehending such conclusions as can recur in memory without attending further 
to the proofs which led me to make them [HR, II, 38; emphasis Frankfurt's]. 
This passage is accurate for the discussion of thefifth Meditation. Descartes has 
not hinted at the restriction, however, much less expressly announced it, in the 
third Meditation. The inference I have drawn on the basis of the third Medita- 
tion passage is, obviously, that in the second Meditation Descartes had not 
removed all doubt about his own existence since he had not yet offered his 
proofs about God. 
In "Memory and the Cartesian Circle" (Philosophical Review, LXXI [i962], 
504-5 I I), Frankfurt argues persuasively that Descartes does not question 
memory as such and then use a nondeceiving God to validate it. But I disagree 
with his claim that "Descartes did not attempt to justify present clear and dis- 
tinct perceptions" (p. 5io). The reason has to do with ambiguity in the notion 
of clear and distinct perception. See Allaire, op.sit. 
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he "observes" them.18 On the other hand, in so far as he considers 
himself in terms of a thinking substance (something different from 
the acts which he "observes" and something itself "unobserv- 
able"), there is a need to justify his belief that (to put it briefly) 
where there is an act there is a thinking substance. This belief 
depends for its justification on knowledge that a good God exists. 
It is the justification of this belief which awaits the proofs about 
God. That is, Descartes may doubt that this belief is true (not- 
withstanding a psychological tendency to take it for granted) 
until he has offered those proofs. Doubting that this belief is 
true is a form of self-doubt: whether or not the belief that there 
is a thinking substance accords with the actual existence of such 
a substance is questioned. In turn, the soundness of the argument 
stated in the first section is questioned. Loosely speaking, Des- 
cartes is questioning that argument and its conclusion that a 
thinking substance exists. 
The reading I am advancing has the advantages of both allow- 
ing for and reconciling the recurrent certainty about his own 
existence and the presence of self-doubt in the important and 
puzzling passage from the third Meditation. Or, what amounts to 
roughly the same thing, the reading allows for both Descartes's 
18 Regarding the second Meditation, taken by itself, I would argue that 
(a) Descartes is impressed by and wants to impress us by the existential knowl- 
edge, the existential certainty, provided by "observation" of acts; (b) he does 
not question the claim that acts are in thinking substance; and (c) he is not 
very precise regarding either precisely what exists when he asserts that he 
exists or the grounds for the assertion. I submit that if one approaches the second 
Meditation asking the question of what exactly is being said to exist when he 
says he exists, one finds no single, clear answer. Is it acts of thinking that exist? 
A thinking substance? Is he saying both exist? 
I think there are a number of reasons for the absence of a clear answer. 
One is that Descartes is at least as interested in securing some kind or other of 
existential knowledge against the skeptical import of the first Meditation as in 
establishing his particular substantialist view. Another is the seductive, 
psychologically persuasive character of his belief that acts are in substances: 
it encourages him to suggest the existence of a thinking substance prior to the 
proofs for God. A third reason has to do with the fact that "thinking" is a word 
with different meanings for Descartes. Sometimes it refers to one kind of act, 
acts of thinking. At still other times, it is used to characterize the nature of the 
substance "in" which acts "reside." To assert, as Descartes does in the second 
Meditation, that a thinking thing exists could mean, therefore, different 
things. 
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denials and assertions that self-knowledge involves inference. In 
addition, the reading is faithful to Descartes's claim in the 
"Synopsis" that it is not until the sixth Meditation that the 
discussion of self-knowledge is completed. He clearly and distinctly 
conceives himself to be a thinking substance. Yet it is not until 
the last Meditation that Descartes, having established that God 
is no deceiver, claims that thinking things exist in conformity to 
the way he clearly and distinctly conceives them.19 Therefore it 
is not until the last Meditation that he may say that he, a think- 
ing substance, actually exists.20 
DONALD SIEVERT 
University of Missouri 
19 Husserl accuses Descartes of not doubting, and by implication of not 
justifying, his substance-property ontology. Descartes is alleged to believe 
that by retaining the ontology he has "rescued a little tag-end of the world." 
Husserl goes on to say that "Descartes introduced the apparently insignificant 
but actually fateful change whereby the ego becomes a substantia cogitans. ... 
We remain aloof from all that. . . if we accept nothing here but what we find 
actually given. . .and if accordingly we assert nothing we ourselves do not 
"see." Descartes erred in this respect." See Cartesian Meditations, trans. by 
Dorion Cairns (The Hague, 1970), p. 24. Husserl thus asserts, correctly, that 
Descartes is anxious to preserve the substantialist view. He does not note 
Descartes's doubt about the latter, however, even though he implies that 
Descartes went astray by not restricting himself to a species of "observation." 
As we have seen, this going beyond what "observation" reveals ultimately 
engenders doubt in Descartes's own mind about the legitimacy of viewing the 
self as a substantia cogitans. 
20 I have benefited from the comments of a number of persons, including 
E. B. Allaire, S. Paulson, R. Sarnat, S. Schwarzschild, J. Walters, and the 
editors of this journal, in the writing and revising of this paper. 
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